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1Abstract
We use a panel of a hundred-plus countries with diﬀering degrees
of dollarization to perform an empirical analysis of the eﬀects of ex-
change rate depreciations in economies with high liability dollariza-
tion. The results qualify the common view that countries with higher
dollarization exhibit higher inﬂation pass-through. We show that large
depreciations tend to generate a negative impact on the pass-through
coeﬃcient, this impact being more intense the higher the level of dol-
larization of the economy. We interpret this as evidence that, in highly
dollarized economies, the classic inﬂationary eﬀects of a real depreci-
ation -higher internal demand and imported inﬂation- can be oﬀset
or diminished by both the larger ﬁnancial costs and the balance-sheet
eﬀect, especially if the depreciation is "large". Additionally, the ex-
change rate regime is shown to matter: countries with ﬁxed exchange
rates suﬀer more noticeable balance-sheet eﬀects of large deprecia-
tions.
JEL: F31, F33
Keywords: Inﬂation pass-through, dollarization, balance-sheet
eﬀect, developing economies
21 Introduction
In recent years there has been an impressive development of the literature on
the macroeconomic implications of real exchange rate depreciations. In the
aftermath of the Asian and Latin American crises of the 1990s, researchers
began to challenge the common consensus that a real depreciation has a
positive impact on aggregate demand and is expansionary, which is the tra-
ditional implication of models in the spirit of Mundell-Fleming.
The countries aﬀected by the aforementioned crises experienced large de-
preciations that were at the same time accompanied by severe disruptions in
the real sector of their economies. Behind all these contractionary episodes,
there was usually a story of a currency mismatch generated by a high level of
indebtedness in foreign currency. This was a consequence of the impossibility
of these countries to issue debt in their own currencies, a phenomenon known
in the literature as the “original sin” (see Eichengreen and Hausman, 2003).
As a result, the standard Mundell-Fleming model was extended along the
lines of Krugman (1999) which incorporated, on top of the usual competi-
tiveness eﬀect of real depreciations, the negative impact on ﬁrms’ net worth
of the drastic reduction of the exchange rate. This additional eﬀect of real
exchange rate depreciations, known as the balance-sheet eﬀect, produces a
reduction of domestic investment that attenuates and may even compensate
for the competitiveness eﬀect on output.1
Since then, this balance-sheet eﬀect has been widely studied both the-
oretically (see Aghion et al., 2001; Cespedes et al., 2003, 2004; Choi and
Cook, 2004; Batini et al., 2007; Magud, 2007, among others), and empiri-
cally (see Harvey and Roper, 1999; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002; Forbes, 2002;
Carranza et al., 2003; Aguiar, 2005, among others). Most of these analyses
1The contractionary eﬀects of a real exchange rate depreciation had been already ana-
lyzed in a diﬀerent context by Edwards (1986).
3have stressed the negative impact on ﬁrms’ net worth induced by a real de-
preciation, and the subsequent contractionary impact on output. However,
there has been little attempt to analyze the consequences of balance-sheet
eﬀects on macroeconomic variables other than output. In particular, the
inﬂation pass-through literature has generally overlooked this balance-sheet
eﬀect and it remains the standard view that inﬂation pass-through is higher
in highly dollarized economies than in non-dollarized ones (see Reinhart et
al., 2003; see also Choudhri et al., 2005, for some evidence to the contrary).
T h eo b j e c t i v eo fo u rp a p e ri st oa n a l y z em o r ei nd e p t ht h ep a s s - t h r o u g h
from exchange rate changes into inﬂation by taking into account the balance-
sheet eﬀect likely present in highly dollarized economies (HDEs).2 The ex-
i s t e n c eo ft h i sb a l a n c e - s h e e te ﬀect suggests a lower inﬂation pass-through
of a exchange rate depreciation. We argue that this negative balance-sheet
eﬀect is more intense the higher the level of dollarization of the economy.
Moreover, large depreciations may be associated with even more negative
balance-sheet eﬀects, and therefore with even lower inﬂation, since the re-
duction in ﬁrms’ net worth could be so acute that investment by ﬁrms might
collapse. We support our arguments with a model in the spirit of Cespedes
et al. (2004) that incorporates both the degree of dollarization and the eﬀect
of large depreciations.3
In order to test the implications of our discussion, we collect data on
exchange rates and prices for a large set of countries with varying degrees
of dollarization. The pass-through into inﬂation of nominal depreciations is
then examined in a panel, where a distinction is made between small and large
nominal depreciations by allowing for a threshold-type behavior of inﬂation
rates that depends on the size of the depreciation.
2We deﬁne HDEs as those economies where a high proportion of ﬁrms’ assets or liabil-
ities are denominated in a foreign currency.
3A discussion of the model is included in Appendix I.
4The results suggest that the extent of the pass-through is signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the degree of dollarization of the economy. More dollarized
economies present higher pass-through coeﬃcients, but when the nominal
depreciation is large this relationship changes: large depreciations tend to
reduce the extent of the pass-through and this eﬀect is more intense the
more dollarized the economy is. The result is therefore consistent with the
possible contractionary eﬀects of depreciations in HDEs —via balance-sheets
and ﬁnancial costs—. Additionally, we show that the exchange rate regime
matters: countries with ﬁxed exchange rate regimes present a more intense
balance-sheet eﬀect, whereas the evidence for intermediate regimes is much
weaker and countries with ﬂexible regimes do not seem to experience the
balance-sheet eﬀect at all. Finally, we show evidence which suggests that a
contraction in investment may indeed be the mechanism that generates the
r e d u c t i o ni ni n ﬂation pass-through.
The paper contributes to the literature in four main dimensions. First,
it provides an indirect test of balance-sheet eﬀects, which have so far been
quite elusive to empirical analysis. Second, it gives a step towards a better
understanding of the costs of (high) partial dollarization. Third, it adds to
the discussion on the preference for ﬂexible vs. ﬁxed exchange rate regimes.
Finally, it stresses and analyzes the importance of nonlinearities at the macro
level. Speciﬁcally, it shows evidence of the diﬀering eﬀect of large deprecia-
tions via a balance-sheet-induced collapse of ﬁrms’ investment.
Our paper also relates with the large existing literature on exchange rate
pass-through. However, it is important to point out several diﬀerences with
that literature. First, our approach is more macro in nature. This is the
reason why we look at CPI prices rather than looking at sectorial or im-
port prices as in the Devereux and Engel (2002) framework. We also use
a very wide panel of countries -a more micro approach would signiﬁcantly
5reduce the number of countries that could be used. Moreover, our set of con-
trol variables is slightly diﬀerent from the one used in single country studies
(see for example, Goldberg and Knetter, 1997; Campa and Goldberg, 2005;
and others) but the controls we use are consistent with the data availability
and the macro scope of the analysis. Second, our results focus explicitly
on "dollarization" and "the large depreciation" eﬀect. The former has been
treated empirically in Reinhart et al. (2003), who mentioned superﬁcially
the relationship between dollarization and pass-through, and the works of
Ca’Zorzi et al. (2007), Bigio and Salas (2006), Leiderman et al. (2006) or
Goujon (2006) among others. Evidence of the "large depreciation" eﬀect
on pass-through is scarcer (see Pollard and Coughlin, 2003, for the US or
Khundrakpam, 2007, for India) and no paper that we are aware of combines
the empirical analysis of liability dollarization and the pass-through of large
depreciations. Third, our results are especially relevant to developing coun-
tries. These countries tend to have high degrees of dollarization and suﬀer
large exchange rate swings, but the evidence on the pass-through literature is
much more scarce for them (see Rowland, 2003; Goujon, 2006; Ito and Sato,
2007; Ca’Zorzi et al., 2007; Ghosh and Rajan, 2007a and 2007b). Finally, we
use a simple yet intuitive model (see Appendix I) to justify the interpretation
of the estimated coeﬃcients. Our model is in line with the contributions of
Cespedes et al. (2003, 2004).4
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the main
m e c h a n i s m st h a tw eb e l i e v ea r er e l e v a n tf o rt h ee x c h a n g er a t ep a s s - t h r o u g h
in HDEs and we set the framework for the empirical analysis. Section 3
contains an empirical analysis of exchange rate pass-through and inﬂation
4More complicated models of pass-through can be found in Devereux et al. (2004),
Devereux and Yetman (2003), Devereux and Engel (2002). We do not think that using a
more complex model would add much to the main point of our paper and it would increase
unnecessarily the complexity of the estimation.
6dynamics for a broad panel of countries that emphasizes the impact of both
the degree of liability dollarization and large depreciations. Some conclud-
ing comments are provided in section 4. Two appendices contain the more
technical material.
2 P a s s - t h r o u g hi nH D E s
Before we proceed to the empirical analysis, we review the main channels
t h r o u g hw h i c har i s ei nt h er e a le x c h a n ge rate -a real depreciation- can aﬀect
a HDE. The discussion in this section is formalized in Appendix I, where
we develop a simple model based on Cespedes et al. (2003, 2004), that can
account for the issues mentioned hereafter and that provides a justiﬁcation
for the equations estimated in Section 3.
In HDEs a rise in the real exchange rate can generate, other than the
traditional expansionary competitiveness eﬀect that aﬀects the real side of
the economy, two contractionary eﬀects: the increase in the ﬁnancial cost of
imported capital and the destabilization of the balance-sheet of ﬁrms with a
currency mismatch between assets and liabilities. The ﬁr s tc o s ti sad i r e c t
eﬀect of the depreciation -imported capital goods become more expensive-
while the second is due to the fact that the net worth of those agents with
debts denominated in foreign currency is instantly deteriorated. This deterio-
ration in the balance-sheets may be transferred -via some ﬁnancial restriction,
for example- to the ﬁrm’s investment decisions, which in turn implies that a
real depreciation can end up negatively aﬀecting aggregate internal demand
and having recessionary eﬀects.
The ﬁnal impact of a real depreciation on the internal demand will depend
on the relative strength of the balance-sheet eﬀect versus the competitive-
ness eﬀect. This impact may also depend on the size of the real depreciation.
7In the case of small depreciations, the risk for the indebted ﬁrm rises only
slightly, increasing ﬁnancial costs and negatively aﬀecting investment. How-
ever, in the event of a “large depreciation” the balance-sheet eﬀect can be
especially intense. This means that the net worth deterioration can be so
acute that ﬁrms not only confront high interest rates but also, in some cases,
lose the access to credit. This forces them to liquidate capital or go bankrupt.
The situation can worsen if a severe deterioration in the net worth of banks
takes place, since this compounds the credit restriction problem.5
The balance-sheet eﬀect becomes relevant mainly for ﬁrms that produce
non-tradable goods, since for those ﬁrms the currency mismatch between
assets and liabilities is more damaging. If we consider ﬁrms that produce
tradable goods, the ﬁnal balance-sheet eﬀect may be attenuated. There are
two basic reasons for this. The ﬁrst is that both the assets of tradable
ﬁrms (the ﬂow of revenues) and the foreign debt can be thought of being
denominated in foreign currency. In this case a real depreciation may be
irrelevant or, in case the ﬁrm also has debt denominated in local currency,
may be positive given that the depreciation reduces the relative value of
domestic debt. The second reason is that tradable ﬁrms are subject to the
positive competitiveness eﬀect to which nontradable ﬁrms are not.
This possible attenuation of the balance-sheet eﬀect does not change,
however, our main argument that investment will react more negatively to
the real exchange rate when the depreciation is large. In this case, non-
tradable ﬁrms may be squeezed out of the ﬁnancial market and collapse.
Consequently, aggregate investment is more intensely aﬀected. This result
suggests a nonlinear investment function that has a lower slope (maybe even
negative) with respect to the real exchange rate for "large depreciations".
We attempt to test this eﬀect in the empirical part of the paper. When
5We do not include possible balance-sheet eﬀects in the banking system in our analysis.
8confronting large variations in the real exchange rate, the nonlinearity in the
investment response will be reﬂe c t e di nan o n l i n e a rp a s s - t h r o u g hf r o me x -
change rates to domestic prices. Thus, when the variations in the exchange
rate are small, we should observe the traditional results of positive and large
pass-through (we elaborate more on this later). However, when a nomi-
nal depreciation pushes the real exchange rate over some threshold value,
the drastic drop in aggregate investment may counter the competitiveness-
induced rise in domestic prices. As a result, the extent of pass-through would
be lower or, even, negative. The intensity of this eﬀect must be related to
the degree of dollarization in the economy.
The model in Appendix I formalizes the above arguments. The model
explains pass-through in HDEs taking into account the competitiveness and
balance-sheet eﬀects of a real exchange rate depreciation. It includes a non-
linear investment function of the form:
it =( λ + χρ)(et − pt);χ = 1[(et − pt) >ϕ ] (1)
where it is aggregate investment, et is the nominal exchange rate, pt is the
domestic price level and ϕ is the threshold that determines a "large deprecia-
tion".6 The indicator function χ = 1[(et − pt) >ϕ ] t a k e sv a l u eo n ei ft h er e a l
depreciation is larger than the threshold ϕ and zero otherwise. The parame-
ter λ measures the regular balance-sheet eﬀe c ta n dt h ep a r a m e t e rρ measures
the additional (negative) eﬀect of a large depreciation (see Appendix I).
As Appendix I shows, under some simplifying assumptions a resulting
equilibrium evolution for domestic inﬂation πt corresponds to:
πt =( φ1 + χφ2)∆et + φ3∆Zt + φ4πt−1; χ = 1[∆et >ϕ ] (2)
6All variables are in logarithms. A formal justiﬁcation for this nonlinear investment
equation can be found in Carranza et al. (2008).
9where ∆et is the nominal depreciation and ∆Zt is the change in exogenous
variables other than the nominal exchange rate. In this equation, φ1 and
(φ1 + φ2) measure the exchange rate pass-through in the goods market of
a "small" and "large" nominal depreciation, respectively. We attempt to
examine these coeﬃcients in our empirical analysis and, more speciﬁcally,
see if they may be related to the level of dollarization of the economy.
3 Empirical Analysis
Equation (2) and the discussion contained in Appendix I suggest some testable
empirical implications of pass-through in the context of HDEs. First, in
HDEs a nominal depreciation may generate a contractionary balance-sheet
eﬀect —a reduction in ﬁrms’ investment— that goes counter the typical ex-
pansionary competitiveness eﬀect. Thus, the exchange rate-inﬂation pass-
through in a HDE may be attenuated or, given extreme values of the struc-
tural parameters, even become negative. Second, the extent of this balance-
sheet eﬀect depends on the degree of dollarization of the economy. Third,
the balance-sheet eﬀect —and the attenuation of pass-through— will be espe-
cially intense in the presence of a large depreciation. Finally, and in line with
previous literature, the degree of openness of the economy will be related to
higher pass-through, both because of a higher competitiveness eﬀect and a
lower balance-sheet eﬀect in the relatively larger tradable sector.
We test now these implications regarding pass-through, dollarization and
other relevant macroeconomic variables in a cross-country panel setting.
3.1 Data
Our interest in the empirical analysis lies in testing that the level of dollariza-
tion matters for the pass-through coeﬃcients. More speciﬁcally, we attempt
10to test that, due to ﬁnancial costs and balance-sheet eﬀects, in more dollar-
ized economies the extent of the pass-through of a nominal depreciation may
b es m a l l e rt h a ni nl e s sd o l l a r i z e dc o u n t r i e s ,o re v e nn e g a t i v e ,a n dt h a tt h i s
is even more so in the presence of large depreciations.
Since our analysis is inherently cross-country, it should cover the widest
possible set of countries. These countries should be heterogeneous in their
level of dollarization. For this purpose, we built a comprehensive database
that contains prices and exchange rate data for one hundred and twenty four
countries. These data come from the IFS database. This database covers
a total of 169 countries but some had to be excluded due to problems of
data availability and speciﬁc features of their economies (see Table 1 for a
list of countries and the reasons for exclusion). In particular, we eliminated
fully dollarized countries and countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate during the
complete sample period. For consistency of the time series procedure, we
also eliminated countries with missing data in intermediate periods.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
Since the model in Appendix I explicitly solves for the evolution of a
domestic composite price index, we use a quarterly 12-month CPI inﬂation
rate as a measure of inﬂation. Exchange rate depreciation rates have been
calculated quarterly using the nominal exchange rate expressed in units of
local currency per dollar.7
The sample runs from 1996:Q1 to 2004:Q4. The choice of the initial period
rested mainly on the availability of data for several emerging economies.8
7The dollar is the currency that most countries borrow in, so this exchange rate is the
logical choice. This argument also justiﬁes excluding from the dataset both fully dollarized
countries and countries with a ﬁxed exchange rate with the dollar.
8For emerging markets, the early 1990s was a period of rather large ﬂuctuations in
foreign exchange. Thus, despite the higher volatility of the data from those years, one
11This leaves us with a panel of 124 countries and a maximum of 36 time
periods. Countries with some missing observations at the beginning or at the
end of the sample were included, and consequently our panel is unbalanced.
Table 1 also shows the amount of usable observations available per country.
In order to account for the inﬂuence of the degree of dollarization, we have
used the measure of dollarization developed by Reinhart et al. (2003). This
is an index constructed as a weighted average of three indicators: percentage
of bank deposits and domestic debt denominated in foreign currency, and
percentage of external debt denominated in foreign currency. Even though
this measure is time invariant, we use it for several reasons. First, it is
the most comprehensive classiﬁcation of degrees of dollarization that we are
aware of, since it covers almost the whole population of countries. Second, the
weighted averages already include some time-varying information. Finally,
except in countries that go through drastic changes -Ecuador, for instance-
time-varying measures of dollarization tend to be quite constant over time
-this fact was also noted by Reinhart et al. (2003).9
We use four sets of additional control variables. The ﬁrst three come
from the WDI database of the World Bank. First we include the degree
of openness of the economy (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP), a
likely determinant of pass-through intensity. Second, since in periods of lower
overall activity inﬂation rates are lower, we control for the economic cycle
would expect to have more power to uncover relevant results using those data. Our analysis
of a more tranquil period —at least with regards to inﬂation— is still able to uncover quite
clearly the evidence of a balance-sheet eﬀect in pass-through in HDEs. This is, we believe,
much in favor of our analysis. We are especially indebted to Carmen Reinhart for bringing
up this point.
9As an alternative, we tried to use the time-varying ratios of liability dollarization in
Moody’s Statistical Handbook. However, these ratios are only available for 28 of our 124
countries, which largely reduced the size and representativeness of our panel. Results using
this measure are not presented, but are available upon request. The general results appear
unchanged, but signiﬁcance of the relationships is aﬀected by the scarcity of countries.
12by including real GDP growth. In a ﬁnal robustness analysis, we include a
measure of investment growth (real Gross Fixed Capital Formation growth,
GFCF). Annual series of these three control variables were available for most
countries in our sample. The fact that these controls are only available at
the annual level does not invalidate the estimation. For example, openness
ratios are quite constant over time, so the lower frequency of variation is not
likely to aﬀect the results signiﬁcantly. Homogeneous measures of quarterly
real GDP or GFCF growth are quite diﬃcult, if not impossible, to ﬁnd for a
wide set of countries, and the use of yearly growth allows us to keep a large
number of countries in the panel.10
I no r d e rt oa c c o u n tf o rp o s s i b l ed i ﬀerences in average inﬂation of more
open and fast-growing countries, openness and either GDP growth or GFCF
growth are included as separate regressors. Moreover, in order to control for
diﬀerent pass-through intensity in open countries and along the cycle, they
are also interacted with the depreciation rate.
The fourth set of control variables accounts for the exchange rate regimes
that the countries are subject to. Theoretical analyses have shown that the
exchange rate regime aﬀects the intensity of balance-sheet eﬀects. In par-
ticular, balance-sheet eﬀe c t sa r ef o u n dt ol e a dt og r e a t e rf a l l si no u t p u ta n d
investment under ﬁxed exchange rates than under ﬂexible rates (see Ces-
pedes et al., 2004, or Magud, 2007). We should then expect the negative
impact on pass-through coeﬃcients to be more noticeable in countries with
ﬁxed exchange rate regimes. We therefore include two dummies, which con-
trol for ﬁxed and intermediate (dirty ﬂoats or crawling pegs) regimes. These
10A previous version of the paper used quarterly data of these two control variables for
a reduced number of countries (45 for the openness ratios and 49 for real growth). The
results were comparable, but the reduced number of observations aﬀected the signiﬁcance
of the estimated coeﬃcients. More importantly, the reduced database could be subject to
sample selection bias. The current analysis is much more comprehensive and robust.
13data come from Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). In the ﬁnal panel, we
include the two dummies along with their interactions with the depreciation
rate, and with the dollarization and the large depreciation variables.
3.2 Methodology
We estimate inﬂation pass-through regressions of the form:
πit = δ0i + δ1πit−1 + δ2∆eit−1 + δ3di∆eit−1 + δ41(∆eit−1 >ϕ )+... (3)
... + δ5di1(∆eit−1 >ϕ )∆eit−1 + δ
0Xit + uit
where πit is domestic price inﬂation of country i at time t, ∆eit−1 is the
lagged nominal depreciation rate of the exchange rate expressed in units of
local currency per dollar, di is the measure of dollarization, 1(∆eit−1 >ϕ )
is an indicator function that takes value one if the nominal depreciation
rate exceeds some level ϕ and zero otherwise, and Xit includes the control
variables.
This speciﬁcation implies that when the nominal depreciation is small
(∆eit−1 ≤ ϕ), the behavior of the inﬂation rate is:
πit = δ0i + δ1πit−1 + δ2∆eit−1 + δ3di∆eit−1 + δ
0Xit + uit (4)
and when the nominal depreciation is larger than ϕ the behavior is:
πit =( δ0i + δ4)+δ1πit−1 + δ2∆eit−1 +( δ3 + δ5)di∆eit−1 + δ
0Xit + uit (5)




= δ2 + δ3di + δ5di1(∆et−1 >ϕ )+... (6)
... + δ7openit + δ9GDPit + ...
+δ11Intit + δ12Intitdi1(∆et−1 >ϕ )+δ14Fix it + δ15Fix itdi1(∆et−1 >ϕ )
14where openi,t, GDPi,t, Intit and Fix it are the controls for openness, real
GDP growth, intermediate and ﬁxed exchange rate regimes, respectively.11
Our main interest lies on the parameters δ3 and δ5. If there is an impact of
the degree of dollarization on pass-through, these two coeﬃcients (which are
related to the coeﬃcients λ and ρ in equation (1), respectively) should be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Moreover, we expect δ5 to be negative.12
In order to estimate the panel, we follow two diﬀerent approaches. As
a ﬁrst benchmark, we estimate the parameters conditional on ϕ =0 , 0.15.
In the ﬁrst case, the parameter δ5 would measure the diﬀerential impact of
depreciations versus appreciations. In the second case, δ5 will be capturing
the diﬀerential pass-through of depreciations larger than ﬁfteen per cent.13
To estimate these benchmark panels, we use the 2SLS procedure in Arellano
(2003) for dynamic panels with lagged dependent variables and exogenous
variables in a large T setting (see Appendix II). We take three lags of the
depreciation rate as instruments, along with the dollarization and control
variables. Time dummies were included in some of the analyses, but they
never contributed signiﬁcantly to the explanatory power of the regressions.
Secondly, we estimate ϕ endogenously, using a conditional least squares
approach. We follow the threshold literature (see, Chan and Tsay, 1998, or
Tsay, 2002) and estimate the above model for a full grid of values of ϕ.A s
estimate of ϕ we take the value that minimizes the sum of squared residuals.
Standard errors for ϕ are calculated using 200 replications of a bootstrap on
11Note that not all controls are included in all the estimated panels, so the expression
for the pass-through coeﬃcient diﬀers depending on the set of controls.
12A separate term in the equation for the dollarization level could be included to account
for a higher level of inﬂation in dollarized countries. However, given that our main measure
of dollarization is time invariant, that impact is captured by the individual eﬀects.
13Results for a full grid of conditioning values of ϕ are available from the authors. These
results tell the same story, though. We include those for ϕ =0 .15 in Table 2 for comparison
purposes.
15the cross-sectional units. The grid for ϕ is constrained to ϕ ∈ [0,0.3] since
we are interested speciﬁcally in large depreciations but very few countries
have experienced a quarterly depreciation rate larger than 30 per cent.
3.3 Results
Table 2 shows the results for the two versions of equation (3) with ϕ con-
strained to 0 and 0.15, whereas Table 3 shows the results of the endogenous
estimation of ϕ. We omit the individual eﬀects b δ0i from the tables. The
ﬁrst columns in both tables show several pass-through equations where the
dollarization or large depreciation variables have been omitted. We do not
comment on the results of these baseline equations, that are in line with the
literature, but oﬀer them for the sake of completeness and for comparison
purposes.
The results in Table 2 are quite consistent with previous ﬁndings in the lit-
erature. First, inﬂation rates are highly persistent (δ1 =0 .86). Second, direct
pass-through coeﬃcients (δ2) are in general small and not signiﬁcant, proba-
bly due to the heterogeneity across countries in the various pass-through de-
terminants and to the inclusion of the terms with control variables.14 Third,
countries with a higher degree of dollarization present higher pass-through
coeﬃcients (signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient δ3). The estimated values of
δ3 suggest that the level of dollarization increases the exchange rate pass-
through by two to three per cent per unit of the dollarization index in Rein-
hart et al. (2003) —that ranges from 0 to 25. Thus, highly dollarized countries
could have pass-through coeﬃcients of around 40% to 50%, a result which is
consistent with the ﬁndings in Reinhart et al. (2003).
14Given the form of pass-through in equation (6), it is no surprise that δ2 becomes
insigniﬁcant when controls are included since the extent of pass-through is captured by
the dollarization, openness, GDP growth and exchange rate regime variables through the
coeﬃcients δ3, δ5, δ7, δ9, δ11, δ12, δ14 and δ15.
16This last result deserves additional comments. We have stressed through-
out the paper that the negative balance-sheet eﬀe c tm u s tb el a r g e rd e p e n d i n g
o nt h ed e g r e eo fd o l l a r i z a t i o n ,as t a t e m e n tw h i c hs e e m st ob ea to d d sw i t h
the result just mentioned. In light of the discussion in Appendix I, several
factors can explain this result: dollarized countries may be more open (see
Weymouth, 2006, or Frankel and Cavallo, 2006), have a larger elasticity of de-
mand for their tradables or have larger inﬂationary eﬀects of output growth.15
In other words, δ3 is parallel to φ1 in Appendix I, a parameter that contains
the three diﬀerent impacts mentioned plus the "regular" balance-sheet eﬀect
that depends on λ. We obtain a positive estimate of δ3. This means that the
pass-through is higher the higher the degree of dollarization, but it does not
imply that λ is a positive function of dollarization, since the reasons outlined
above can compensate for the lower value of λ.
The estimate of the "large depreciation" eﬀect δ5 would be capturing
the unconditionally negative impact measured by ρ, which is indeed more
negative the larger the degree of dollarization. The results in Tables 2 and 3
quite strongly support this hypothesis. Table 2 shows that the coeﬃcient δ5
is signiﬁcant and negative. In other words, large depreciations —or, simply,
depreciations as in the case of ϕ =0 — have a negative impact on pass-through
that is more intense the higher the level of dollarization of the country. Thus,
HDEs present high pass-through coeﬃcients —commented above— but this
pass-through is less intense for large depreciations. The estimated value of δ5
suggests that when the depreciation is large, pass-through in HDEs is reduced
by 1 to 2 per cent per unit of the index in Reinhart et al. (2003). Note that
in none of the cases the magnitude of δ5 is big enough to compensate for δ3.
15Additionally, Devereux and Yetman (2003) show that two other factors, which are also
higher in dollarized economies, increase the degree of pass-through: the level of inﬂation
and exchange rate volatility. Even though the country ﬁxed eﬀects may capture the eﬀect
of these two factors, the estimate of δ3 probably also accounts for part of it.
17However, the coeﬃcient is robust, quite stable and always negative, across
panels and control variables.16
The inclusion of control variables does not aﬀect the results of the pass-
through coeﬃcients much, but it provides interesting additional evidence.
Openness is positively related to the intensity of pass-through, as the consis-
tently positive and signiﬁcant value of δ7 —interaction of openness with the
depreciation rate— shows. The magnitude of this coeﬃcient is between 0.10
and 0.14: an increase in the openness ratio of ten per cent increases pass-
through by one per cent. The inclusion of real GDP growth has an interesting
eﬀect: it increases the eﬀect of openness (δ7 increases from 0.1 to 0.14) and
the coeﬃcient on the interaction of real growth with the depreciation, δ9,
becomes signiﬁcantly negative, suggesting that fast-growing countries show
smaller inﬂation pass-through. We comment on the exchange-rate regime
controls at the end of the section.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Table 3 shows the results of the endogenous estimation of ϕ.T h e s ea r e
not essentially diﬀerent from those of Table 2 (ϕ =0 .15), since the estimated
threshold is around thirteen per cent in all the estimated panels. Addition-
ally, the estimated values of ϕ across bootstrap resamples are concentrated
around the mean value, so the estimate of the threshold appears to be quite
robust. All the δ coeﬃcients are comparable to those in Table 2, ϕ =0 .15
case. The results point again at higher pass-through coeﬃcients in dollarized
economies, but also at a negative impact of the level of dollarization in the
16Our discussion suggests the possibility of negative pass-through and some evidence
for this has been found in Bolivia in 2001 (Leiderman et al., 2006) and, maybe, in Peru
in the 1990s (Bigio and Salas, 2006), both HDEs. However, given the estimated values
of δ3 and δ5, it is clear that a negative pass-through should be the exception: the "large
depreciation" eﬀect implies an attenuation of the pass-through but it is not enough to
make it negative.
18pass-through coeﬃcient in the face of large depreciation rates. The standard
errors included in Table 3 for the δ coeﬃcients are regular 2SLS conditional
on the value of ϕ that minimizes the objective function. The bootstrap esti-
mates of the δ coeﬃcients were skewed to the left, and so the regular t-ratios
are biased towards zero. In Figure 1 we show kernel estimates of the distri-
butions of b δ5. It can be seen that most of the resamples —see the last line
in Table 3— yielded negative values of the parameter. Thus, the negative b δ5,
our main coeﬃcient of interest, is robust even to sampling of the countries
in the analysis. The panels with control variables behave similarly to those
for constrained ϕ,s ow ed on o td w e l li nm o r ed e t a i l .
Regarding the exchange rate regime controls, the results are quite sat-
isfactory and in line with the theoretical literature on balance-sheet eﬀects.
The last columns of Table 2 and Table 3 show that when the exchange rate
regime is controlled for, the estimate of δ5 loses signiﬁcance and it becomes
basically zero. However, the negative pass-through eﬀect is picked up by
t h ei n t e r m e d i a t ea n dﬁxed exchange rate-regime variables. More speciﬁcally,
the intermediate regime presents a mild negative impact on pass-through for
large depreciations (-0.008) whereas the ﬁxed regime presents a large and
highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient (-0.015). The fact that the baseline estimate δ5
is not signiﬁcant implies that, for fully ﬂexible regimes, the "large deprecia-
tion" balance-sheet eﬀect on pass-through does not seem to be present. This
result is in line with the implications of models such as those in Cespedes et
al. (2004) and Magud (2007), among others, and points at ﬂexible exchange
r a t e sa sb e t t e rs h o c ka b s o r b e r st h a nﬁxed exchange rates.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Finally, we carry out one last exercise aimed at exploring whether it is
19indeed a contraction in investment the mechanism that is behind the esti-
mated balance-sheet eﬀect, as the model in Appendix I and our discussion
suggest. A simple way of examining this hypothesis is to substitute the con-
trol for GDP growth by a control for investment growth (GFCF growth). If
the reaction of investment to large depreciations is behind the balance-sheet
eﬀect, then controlling for investment growth should make the coeﬃcient
that measures the eﬀect of large depreciations insigniﬁcant or, at least, of
smaller magnitude. Figure 2 shows a graphical summary of the results of the
balance-sheet eﬀect estimates for large depreciations (δ5 in the baseline case
or the combination of δ5 and the exchange-rate regime coeﬃcients δ12 and
δ15 in the equations that control for the exchange rate regime) conditional
on ϕ.I n t h e ﬁgure we plot the point estimates of the large depreciation
eﬀect for each possible value of ϕ used in our estimation procedure. It is
clear that, even for the three separate exchange rate regimes, the inclusion of
investment growth reduces the magnitude of the estimate of δ5. The result
holds when compared to the regular equations with GDP growth as con-
trol or to the "no cyclical control" case. Therefore, once we account for the
investment behavior, the lower pass-through induced by large depreciations
is much reduced. This result suggests that contractions in investment are,
at least, partly responsible for the lower pass-through found in HDEs when
large depreciations occur (and, by extension, for the lower economic activity
found in the literature).
The ﬁgure also includes the results for the case where GDP growth is
used as control: given that investment is part of output and it is therefore
an output contraction what generates the balance-sheet eﬀect, the inclusion
of output should also lead to a reduction of the estimated balance-sheet pa-
rameters. However, since there are expansionary eﬀects in output coming
from a depreciation (the competitiveness eﬀect) including a broad measure
20of output growth may not necessarily have as clear-cut an eﬀect as when
investment growth is included as control. This is indeed what we ﬁnd. In
particular, in the three panels of Figure 2 that account for the exchange
rate regime, we can observe that using output as a control also reduces the
magnitude of the estimate of the δ5 parameter, although by less than when
we include investment as a control. This result is consistent across the three
exchange rate regimes and, we believe, it supports our argument that the sub-
stantial negative balance-sheet eﬀect of a large depreciation impacts mainly
investment.17
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
We believe the evidence presented is quite supportive of our conclusion
that dollarization plays a role in the response of inﬂation to nominal depre-
ciations, but that this role is nonlinear: in the face of large depreciations,
balance-sheet eﬀects attenuate or compensate the traditional inﬂationary ef-
fects on domestic inﬂation. The results also support the intuition of the simple
model by which the mechanism that generates the balance-sheet eﬀect is the
negative impact of a large depreciation on ﬁrms’ investment.
4C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have taken a closer look at the traditional analysis of ex-
change rate-inﬂation pass-trough. Little work has been done so far on the
diﬀerences induced by the degree of dollarization in pass-through coeﬃcients.
The accepted view (see Reinhart et al., 2003) is that pass-through is signif-
17The result is not as clear in panel A of Figure 2 where the eﬀect of the exchange rate
regime is not controlled for. The interplay between GDP growth and the exchange rate
regime (see Cespedes et al., 2004) may be behind this result.
21icantly higher in HDEs. We go a step further and qualify these results by
stressing the importance of what we call a "large depreciation" eﬀect.
As i m p l em o d e lw i t haﬁnancial friction suggests the possibility of an
attenuation —and, in extreme cases, a change in the sign— of pass-through
coeﬃcients when balance-sheet eﬀects are important. In particular, when
exchange rate depreciations are large, a nonlinearity may appear that in-
tensiﬁes the negative balance-sheet eﬀect. This suggests a threshold-type
behavior of inﬂation rates with respect to nominal depreciations.
The results of our extensive empirical analysis are consistent with the
accepted view that pass-through coeﬃcients are larger in HDEs. However,
the results also robustly support the intuition (backed by the model in Ap-
pendix I) that large depreciations have a negative impact on pass-through
coeﬃcients and that this negative impact is higher the higher the degree of
dollarization of the economy. When the exchange rate regime is controlled
for, the results suggest that these negative balance-sheet eﬀects are mostly
a ﬁxed-exchange rate regime story, whereas countries with intermediate or
ﬂexible rates seem to be less subject to these eﬀects. Finally, we show indi-
rect evidence which conﬁrms that investment behavior may be behind this
balance-sheet eﬀect, as we postulated.
Our main interest was to give a ﬁrst look at the existence of a mechanism
that has so far been neglected in the literature. Balance-sheet considerations
in dollarized countries lead to eﬀects of exchange rate changes that go against
the traditional implications of Mundell-Fleming based models. Evidence for
output has been more thoroughly analyzed but an analysis of the inﬂationary
implications was still lacking and we believe that our exercise helps to close
the gap in that direction. In particular, the "large depreciation" eﬀect had
not been yet analyzed in the context of high dollarization.
Our analysis focused on the behavior of inﬂation rates. However, taking
22the implications further, our results also show that the traditional trade-oﬀ
between inﬂation and employment is contingent on the level of dollarization
and exchange rate regime of the economy. The model and empirical evi-
dence suggest that the extent of this trade-oﬀ changes with the degree of
dollarization of the economy —through a balance-sheet eﬀect— and is likely to
diﬀer depending on the size of the movements in the exchange rate. This has
important implications for policymakers: monetary authorities, for exam-
ple, should take this feature into account when designing and implementing
exchange-rate based stabilization policies.
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Appendix I: A justiﬁcation of the reduced-
form equations
Following Cespedes et al. (2003), our macro analysis is based on a set
of reduced form relationships. We abstract, however, from the assets mar-
ket and assume that the exchange rate changes are exogenous to the goods
market. For simplicity, we present only the (linearized) relationships that
are relevant to our argument. We assume our economy to be small and with
a high degree of liability dollarization, so that a large proportion of ﬁrms’
debts are denominated in foreign currency.
26The ﬁrst equation is the deﬁnition of a domestic consumer price index
(CPI) which depends on the price of tradeable and nontradable goods:
pt = δp
nt
t +( 1− δ)et (A.1)
where pt is the logarithm of the CPI at time t, pnt
t is the logarithm of the price
level of nontradable goods, et is the logarithm of the nominal exchange rate
and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 is the proportion of nontradable goods in the consumption
bundle. We normalize international prices to one.




t = βyt + σpt−1 (A.2)
where yt i st h el o g a r i t h mo ft h eo u t p u tg a p ,β measures the impact of excess
aggregate demand on nontradable prices, and σ measures inertial factors of
the economy (e.g. through salary pressures). For simplicity we consider the
natural level of income to be zero.
Aggregate demand is given by the following equation:
yt = κit + γZt + α(et − pt) (A.3)
where it is the logarithm of the investment level and Zt contains other exoge-
nous variables aﬀecting the income level. The parameters κ and γ measure
the impact of investment and those other variables on aggregate demand,
respectively. The parameter α represents the competitiveness impact of the
real exchange rate (a larger real exchange rate -a real depreciation- implies
a larger foreign net demand).
We postulate now that investment may respond negatively to increases in
t h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ed u et ot h eh i g hd o l l a r i z a t i o no fﬁrms’ debts (negative
balance-sheet eﬀect). The rationale for this relationship is that a higher real
exchange rate reduces ﬁrms’ net worth if there is a mismatch between the
27currency composition of liabilities and the ﬁrms’ ﬂow of income. This reduc-
tion in net worth increases the cost of capital for the ﬁrm and generates a
negative impact on the ﬁrm’s level of investment. Furthermore, when ﬁrms
are ﬁnancially vulnerable it may be the case that, if a large real deprecia-
tion occurs, the net worth deterioration of ﬁr m si ss os e v e r et h a tt h e yw i l l
be squeezed out of the credit market. In this extreme case, nonlinearities
appear in the investment function since ﬁrms react more strongly when the
depreciation is beyond some threshold value.
A simple partial equilibrium model that explains the appearance of this
relationship between investment and the exchange rate can be found in Car-
ranza et al. (2008). A version of the investment function that includes this
nonlinearity could be the following:
it =( λ + χρ)(et − pt);χ = 1[(et − pt) >ϕ ] (A.4)
The parameter λ (which could be either positive or negative) measures
the slope of the investment function with respect to the real exchange rate
in the "regular values" range, i.e. when the real exchange rate is below
some threshold ϕ. The magnitude of λ depends on both ﬁnancial costs
of investment and the balance-sheet eﬀect of a real depreciation for both
tradable and nontradable ﬁrms (see Carranza et al., 2008). The parameter
ρ m e a s u r e st h e" l a r g ed e p r e c i a t i o n "e ﬀect, and it captures the change in the
slope of the investment function when the real exchange rate is beyond some
threshold ϕ. As Carranza et al. (2008) show, this slope (λ + ρ) must be lower
than λ,s ot h a tρ<0. The function 1[(et − pt) >ϕ ] is an indicator function,
which takes value one if the real exchange rate is beyond the threshold ϕ.
The size of the two eﬀects measured by λ and ρ will depend on the extent of
the mismatch between the currency composition of liabilities and the ﬁrms’
expected ﬂows of income. Therefore, at the aggregate level, these eﬀects will
28be more intense the higher the degree of dollarization of the economy (see
Carranza et al., 2008). In other words, both λ and ρ are negative functions
of the degree of dollarization.
Combining now equations (A.1) to (A.4) and solving for the price level
-note that we assume exogenous changes in the exchange rate and sticky
prices, so that a nominal depreciation induces a real depreciation-, we obtain:
pt =( φ1 + χφ2)et + φ3Zt + φ4pt−1; χ = 1[∆et >ϕ ] (A.5)
where, if we call ω = 1
1+δβ(α−κ(λ+χρ)),t h e nφ1 = ω(1 − δ + δβα+ δβκλ),
φ2 = ω(δβκρ), φ3 = ω(δβγ) and φ4 = ω(δσ).T h e c o e ﬃcients φ1 and φ2
measure the exchange rate pass-through in the goods market of a nominal
depreciation. Notice that this pass-through contains four diﬀerent terms:
1. The term (1 − δ) measures "imported inﬂation", the impact of a de-
preciation on the price of imported tradable goods.
2. The term δβα measures the "export-push" inﬂationary eﬀect of an
increase in foreign demand.
3. The term δβκλ measures the regular "balance-sheet eﬀect", which may
be positive or negative (see Carranza et al., 2008).
4. The term δβκρ measures the "large depreciation eﬀect", which is a
nonlinearity in the balance-sheet eﬀect: if the depreciation is beyond a
threshold ϕ, the impact on prices will be lower (negative ρ) because of
the collapse of nontradable ﬁrms’ investment.
Diﬀerencing this equation leads to a reduced-form expression that corre-
sponds to the equation estimated in the paper:
πt =( φ1 + χφ2)∆et + φ3∆Zt + φ4πt−1; χ =1[ ∆et >ϕ ] (A.6)
29where πt is the CPI inﬂation rate and ∆et is the change in the nominal
exchange rate.
Appendix II: 2SLS estimation of panels con-
ditional on ϕ
Given the reduced form equation we want to estimate:
πit = δ0 + δ1πit−1 + δ2∆eit−1 + δ3dit∆eit−1 + ... (A.7)
... + δ41(∆eit−1 >ϕ )++ δ5dit1(∆eit−1 >ϕ )∆eit−1 + δ
0Xit + uit
a n do n c eav a l u ef o rϕ has been ﬁxed, the model becomes a simple linear
dynamic panel. Let the stacked form of the model be:
y = Wδ+ Cη+ u (A.8)
where y is the
P
i Ti×1 vector of stacked inﬂation rates, η is an N ×1 vector
of individual eﬀects and C is a
P
i Ti × N matrix of individual dummies.
The matrix W is the
P
i Ti × KW matrix of explanatory variables, which
includes the lagged inﬂation rate, the pass-through terms and possible control
variables. We assume uit to be iid across t and i.
Let Z be a
P
i Ti × KZ matrix of instruments, where KZ ≥ KW.T h e n
the 2SLS estimator of (δ,η),u s i n gZ and the individual dummies C as in-


































are the ﬁtted values
of W∗ in a regression on Z∗. As Arellano (2003) mentions, when T is large
this procedure, using lags of the exogenous variables as instruments for the
lagged dependent variable, is consistent even if the instruments are only
30predetermined. Becker et al. (1994), for example, use this same approach
for a panel shorter than ours (T =3 1 ).
31In 124 # of obs.* DOL2** Reason to exclude In 124 # of obs.* DOL2** Reason to exclude
Albania Yes 30 Lithuania Yes 31
Algeria Yes 30 Luxembourg Yes 31
Angola Yes 31 Macedonia, FYR Yes 30
Argentina Yes 31 Yes Madagascar Yes 31
Armenia Yes 31 Malawi Yes 30
Aruba No Fixed Exchange Rate Malaysia Yes 31 Yes
Australia Yes 31 Maldives No Fixed Exchange Rate
Austria Yes 31 Mali Yes 30
Azerbaijan No No CPI Data Malta Yes 30
Bahamas No Fully dollarized Mauritania Yes 27
Bahrain No Fixed Exchange Rate Mauritius Yes 31 Yes
Bangladesh Yes 27 Mexico Yes 31 Yes
Barbados No Fixed Exchange Rate Moldova Yes 28 Yes
Belarus No No CPI Data Mongolia Yes 29
Belgium Yes 31 Morocco Yes 28 Yes
Belize No Fixed Exchange Rate Mozambique Yes 29
Benin Yes 29 Myanmar Yes 28
Bolivia Yes 31 Yes Namibia No No dollarization value
Bosnia No No CPI Data Nepal Yes 30
Botswana Yes 31 Netherlands Yes 31
Brazil Yes 31 Yes Netherlands Antilles No Fixed Exchange Rate
Bulgaria Yes 31 Yes New Zealand Yes 31
Burkina Faso Yes 31 Nicaragua Yes 30 Yes
Burundi Yes 31 Niger Yes 28
Cambodia Yes 31 Nigeria Yes 30
Cameroon Yes 23 Norway Yes 31
Canada Yes 31 Oman No Fixed Exchange Rate
Cape Verde Yes 24 Pakistan Yes 31 Yes
Central African Rep. Yes 30 Panama No Fully dollarized
Chad Yes 29 Papua New Guinea Yes 30 Yes
Chile Yes 31 Yes Paraguay Yes 30 Yes
China; Macao No Fixed Exchange Rate Peru Yes 31 Yes
China; Mainland No No CPI Data Philippines Yes 31 Yes
China;Hong Kong No Fixed Exchange Rate Poland Yes 31
Colombia Yes 31 Yes Portugal Yes 31
Congo, Dem. Rep. Yes 23 Romania Yes 31
Congo Rep. Of No Incomplete CPI Data Russia Yes 31 Yes
Costa Rica Yes 31 Yes Rwanda No
Cote D'ivoire Yes 29 Samoa Yes 27
Croatia Yes 31 Yes Sao Tome No No CPI Data
Cyprus Yes 31 Saudi Arabia No Fixed Exchange Rate
Czech Rep. Yes 31 Senegal Yes 28
Denmark Yes 31 Seychelles Yes 30
Dominica No Fixed Exchange Rate Sierra Leone Yes 30
Dominican Republic Yes 30 Yes Singapore Yes 31
Ecuador Yes 31 Yes Slovak Republic Yes 31
Egypt Yes 31 Yes Slovenia Yes 31
El Salvador No Fixed Exchange Rate Solomon Islands Yes 28
Estonia Yes 31 South Africa Yes 31 Yes
Ethiopia Yes 27 Spain Yes 31
Fiji Yes 29 Yes Sri Lanka Yes 31
Finland Yes 31 St. Lucia No Fixed Exchange Rate
France Yes 31 St. Vincent & Gre. No Fixed Exchange Rate
Gabon No Incomplete CPI Data St.Kitts and Nevis No Fixed Exchange Rate
Gambia No Incomplete CPI Data Sudan No
Georgia Yes 23 Suriname No
Germany Yes 31 Swaziland Yes 30
Ghana Yes 30 Sweden Yes 31
Greece Yes 31 Switzerland Yes 31
Grenada No Fixed Exchange Rate Syria No Fixed Exchange Rate
Guatemala Yes 31 Yes Taiwan No No CPI Data
Guinea No No CPI Data Tajikistan No No CPI Data
Guinea-Bissau Yes 29 Tanzania Yes 31
Guyana Yes 23 Thailand Yes 31 Yes
Haiti Yes 30 Togo Yes 28
Honduras Yes 31 Yes Tonga Yes 30
Hungary Yes 31 Trinidad and Tobago Yes 28 Yes
Iceland Yes 31 Tunisia Yes 31 Yes
India Yes 30 Yes Turkey Yes 31 Yes
Indonesia Yes 31 Yes Turkmenistan No No CPI Data
Iran, I.R. of Yes 30 Uganda Yes 31
Ireland Yes 31 Ukraine No No CPI Data
Israel Yes 31 United Arab Emirates No No CPI Data
Italy Yes 31 United Kingdom Yes 31
Jamaica Yes 31 Yes United States No Reference currency
Japan Yes 31 Uruguay Yes 31 Yes
Jordan No Fixed Exchange Rate Uzbekistan No No CPI Data
Kazakhstan Yes 31 Yes Vanuatu Yes 28
Kenya Yes 31 Venezuela, Rep. Bol. Yes 31 Yes
Korea Yes 31 Vietnam Yes 31 Yes
Kuwait No Fixed Exchange Rate Yemen No No CPI Data
Kyrgyz Rep. Yes 31 Zambia Yes 23
Lao, P.'s Dem. Rep. Yes 30 Zimbabwe No Incomplete CPI Data
Latvia Yes 31
Lebanon No Fixed Exchange Rate
Lesotho No Incomplete CPI Data
* This column already accounts for the observations lost due to inclusion of lags in the dynamic equation
** Availability of the alternative dollarization variable 
Table 1: List of countries and data availableδ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS
δ1 πt-1 0.881 0.905 0.870 0.893 0.878 0.875 0.876 0.874 0.892 0.865 0.863 0.864 0.861 0.887
95.3 85.5 89.4 80.7 90.7 88.1 89.9 86.8 77.1 94.0 91.3 93.2 90.0 79.3
δ2 Xr  depr. 0.068 0.168 -0.003 0.104 0.048 -0.012 0.048 -0.019 0.086 -0.004 -0.081 0.002 -0.093 -0.007
2.71 4.97 -0.10 3.04 2.34 -0.44 2.31 -0.69 1.59 -0.19 -2.89 0.09 -3.32 -0.15
δ3 Xr depr.*dol 0.013 0.013 0.031 0.030 0.031 0.030 0.016 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.018
6.82 7.00 6.20 5.78 6.23 5.67 3.05 9.91 9.53 9.88 9.45 5.63
δ4 1(Xr depr>φ) 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.049 0.052 0.050 0.056 0.035
0.21 0.29 0.27 0.48 0.09 6.66 6.66 6.73 7.07 4.25
δ5 Xr depr*dol*1(Xrdepr>φ) -0.016 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.001 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.020 0.003
-3.16 -3.05 -3.23 -3.16 -0.13 -5.99 -6.19 -6.20 -6.85 0.43
δ6 Openness ratio -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
-0.84 -0.82 -0.64 -0.45 -0.70 -0.59 -0.44 -0.84 -0.77 -0.62
δ7 Openness ratio*Xr  depr. 0.157 0.102 0.097 0.034 0.086 0.101 0.036 0.107 0.139 0.066
6.04 3.56 3.65 1.19 3.38 3.80 1.27 4.24 5.18 2.27
δ8 rGDP growth -0.028 -0.013 -0.034 -0.018 -0.040 -0.041 -0.020 -0.021 -0.023 -0.014
-1.14 -0.56 -1.45 -0.80 -1.78 -1.73 -0.86 -0.97 -0.99 -0.60
δ9 rGDP growth*Xr depr. -0.866 -0.729 -0.213 -0.152 -0.013 -0.252 -0.165 -0.284 -0.645 -0.227
-4.57 -3.94 -1.03 -0.76 -0.07 -1.20 -0.82 -1.47 -3.05 -1.10
δ10 Intermediate 0.0059 0.0051 0.0052 0.0039
2.30 2.06 2.04 1.58
δ11 Intermediate*Xr  depr. -0.057 -0.061 -0.039 -0.017
-1.75 -1.93 -0.74 -0.39
δ12 Intermediate*dol*Xrdepr*1(Xrdepr>φ) -0.002 -0.009
-0.41 -1.43
δ13 Fixed 0.2174 -3E-04 -4E-04 -6E-04
0.00 -0.12 -0.18 -0.30
δ14 Fixed*Xr depr. -0.104 -0.065 -0.068 0.0053
-2.61 -1.66 -1.19 0.11
δ15 Fixed*dol*Xrdepr*1(Xrdepr>φ) 0.0011 -0.016
0.17 -2.42
sy 0.176 0.155 0.176 0.155 0.171 0.176 0.170 0.176 0.155 0.171 0.176 0.170 0.176 0.155
se 0.052 0.048 0.052 0.046 0.050 0.052 0.050 0.052 0.046 0.050 0.051 0.050 0.051 0.046
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124
sum(Ti) 3427 3079 3427 3079 3718 3427 3710 3427 3079 3718 3427 3710 3427 3079
φ=0 φ=0.15
Table 2: 2SLS-dynamic panel estimates of pass-through equations; φ=constraine
Dependent variable: Interannual CPI-inflation rate; t-stats in second row;
Measure of dollarization in Reinhart et al. (2005)δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS δ2SLS
δ1 πt-1 0.881 0.905 0.870 0.893 0.863 0.861 0.862 0.860 0.884
95.3 85.5 89.4 80.7 92.8 90.2 92.1 89.0 79.5
δ2 Xr  depr. 0.068 0.168 -0.003 0.104 -0.012 -0.087 -0.006 -0.098 -0.004
2.71 4.97 -0.10 3.04 -0.59 -3.15 -0.33 -3.53 -0.08
δ3 Xr depr.*dol 0.013 0.013 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.014
6.82 7.00 8.35 8.01 8.34 7.97 4.38
δ4 1(Xr depr>φ) 0.053 0.055 0.054 0.058 0.036
8.39 8.33 8.44 8.69 5.11
δ5 Xr depr*dol*1(Xrdepr>φ) -0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.016 0.005
-4.30 -4.49 -4.51 -5.11 0.93
δ6 Openness ratio -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
-0.84 -0.82 -0.64 -0.45 -0.95 -0.89 -0.75
δ7 Openness ratio*Xr  depr. 0.157 0.102 0.097 0.034 0.104 0.133 0.062
6.04 3.56 3.65 1.19 4.15 5.01 2.15
δ8 rGDP growth -0.028 -0.013 -0.034 -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.009
-1.14 -0.56 -1.45 -0.80 -0.77 -0.79 -0.42
δ9 rGDP growth*Xr depr. -0.866 -0.729 -0.213 -0.152 -0.268 -0.610 -0.212
-4.57 -3.94 -1.03 -0.76 -1.39 -2.90 -1.04
δ10 Intermediate 0.0059 0.0051 0.0039
2.30 2.06 1.57




δ13 Fixed 0.2174 -3E-04 -6E-04
0.00 -0.12 -0.29




φ -- -- -- -- 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126 0.126
-- -- -- -- 4.03 3.45 3.04 2.56 2.71
sy 0.176 0.155 0.176 0.155 0.171 0.176 0.170 0.176 0.155
se 0.052 0.048 0.052 0.046 0.049 0.051 0.049 0.051 0.0457
N 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124 124
sum(Ti) 3427 3079 3427 3079 3718 3427 3710 3427 3079
% of negative δ5 in bootstrap -- -- -- -- 89% 92% 93% 95% 42%
Table 3: Conditional 2SLS-dynamic panel estimates
Measure of dollarization in Reinhart et al. (2005)
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Panel G: Coefficient on fixed exchange regime
Figure 1: Kernel-density estimates of distribution of bootstrap estimates of the interaction parameter
(Epanechnikov Kernel; Silverman's bandwidth)Figure 2: 
Estimated values of large depreciation pass-through as a function of φ;
baseline case and exchange rate regime controls
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